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The 2004
presidential election and the “peace referendum” have
underscored even further the most divisive and
overpowering issues on Taiwan’s political landscape,
namely, relations to the mainland, and social
identification.
Identity politics in Taiwan is an
extremely controversial topic, and whether one identifies
as “Chinese” or “Taiwanese” can make a significant
difference. Recent trends have signaled a changing and
yet still landscape, a difficult environment to which
politicians on both sides have tried to adapt. |
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Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi
University (Taipei, Taiwan),
site accessed April 2004. |
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| A
Central News Agency (CNA) article attempts to summarize very
quickly the identity politics situation in Taiwan. While this
succinct description is helpful in capturing a broad vista of
understanding, in truth it is, as most succinct descriptions of
complex matters are, an oversimplification. Published in the
Taipei Times, the article reads, |
In the run-up to the 2004 presidential
election, President Chen often assured voters that he wouldn't
cave in to Beijing, and he often questioned his sole challenger
Lien Chan's willingness to stand up to Beijing. Political and
ethnic divisions have become more serious after Taiwan-born Chen
narrowly defeated mainland China-born Lien.
Except for a small group of aboriginal tribes, most of Taiwan's
23 million people are ethnic Chinese. But the population can be
divided into two sub-ethnic groups: the "Mainlanders" whose
families fled to Taiwan when the Chinese Communists took over
the mainland in 1949, and the "native Taiwanese" whose ancestors
began arriving on the island in the 17th century or earlier.
The Mainlanders, about 15 percent of
the population, have largely supported the "pan-blue alliance,"
whose support base is in northern Taiwan. The native Taiwanese
tend to favor the "pan-green camp" of Chen's Democratic
Progressive Party and its smaller ally the Taiwan Solidarity
Union, whose support base is in southern Taiwan.
The Mainlanders have traditionally
supported eventual unification with China, while the native
Taiwanese lean more toward formal independence.
In fact, the March 2004 presidential
election has shown how both the pan-blue Kuomintang (KMT)-People
First Party (PFP) alliance and the pan-green Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP)-Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) alliance has
been forced to adapt to a complex social landscape.
The DPP’s original party platform adopted
by the First National Congress in 1986 listed as one of its tenets
the goal of striving towards an independent Taiwan, cut-off
politically from the mainland. While the ethnic card is still
played by President Chen and others, at the same time the party
has been forced to modify its original party platform stance since
it was brought into the political mainstream, in recognition of a
strong public opposition to upsetting the status quo.
The KMT (an abbreviation for the
Nationalist Party), the party which ruled from 1947 until 2000,
is, as the CNA article describes, stereotypically associated with
strong ties to mainland China – which at various points in their
party’s history might have meant maintenance of the status quo, or
even eventual reunification with the mainland. Yet they too have
modified their image, especially during this presidential
election’s campaigning, as they’ve recognized the necessity to
publicly address the identity issue. Thus, at one point during
the KMT-PFP campaign, Lien and Soong prostrated to Taiwan and
kissed its ground, in a symbolic gesture to brandish their
allegiance to the island. During the post-election recount
controversy, former and current KMT politicians have even
suggested changing the party’s name, omitting “Chinese” from the
name altogether. |
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| Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi
University (Taipei, Taiwan); chart reproduced by Mainland Affairs
Council, site
accessed April 2004. |
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The identity issue and
the associated China issue has overwhelmed the political
landscape, pushing both parties closer and yet further apart, as
both sides attempt to balance the need for cross-Strait stability
with shifting social identifications. In this last election,
domestic development issues were largely cast aside as the
identification/mainland connections topics consistently stole the
spotlight. Meanwhile, economic ties with the mainland grow
stronger, with China recently becoming Taiwan’s largest trade
partner, as both Beijing and Washington keep a close watch.
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