Taiwan’s Identity Politics
 
The 2004 presidential election and the “peace referendum” have underscored even further the most divisive and overpowering issues on Taiwan’s political landscape, namely, relations to the mainland, and social identification.    Identity politics in Taiwan is an extremely controversial topic, and whether one identifies as “Chinese” or “Taiwanese” can make a significant difference.  Recent trends have signaled a changing and yet still landscape, a difficult environment to which politicians on both sides have tried to adapt.
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (Taipei, Taiwan), site accessed April 2004.
 
A Central News Agency (CNA) article attempts to summarize very quickly the identity politics situation in Taiwan.  While this succinct description is helpful in capturing a broad vista of understanding, in truth it is, as most succinct descriptions of complex matters are, an oversimplification.  Published in the Taipei Times, the article reads,
In the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, President Chen often assured voters that he wouldn't cave in to Beijing, and he often questioned his sole challenger Lien Chan's willingness to stand up to Beijing. Political and ethnic divisions have become more serious after Taiwan-born Chen narrowly defeated mainland China-born Lien.

Except for a small group of aboriginal tribes, most of Taiwan's 23 million people are ethnic Chinese. But the population can be divided into two sub-ethnic groups: the "Mainlanders" whose families fled to Taiwan when the Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949, and the "native Taiwanese" whose ancestors began arriving on the island in the 17th century or earlier.

The Mainlanders, about 15 percent of the population, have largely supported the "pan-blue alliance," whose support base is in northern Taiwan. The native Taiwanese tend to favor the "pan-green camp" of Chen's Democratic Progressive Party and its smaller ally the Taiwan Solidarity Union, whose support base is in southern Taiwan.

The Mainlanders have traditionally supported eventual unification with China, while the native Taiwanese lean more toward formal independence.

In fact, the March 2004 presidential election has shown how both the pan-blue Kuomintang (KMT)-People First Party (PFP) alliance and the pan-green Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) alliance has been forced to adapt to a complex social landscape. 

The DPP’s original party platform adopted by the First National Congress in 1986 listed as one of its tenets the goal of striving towards an independent Taiwan, cut-off politically from the mainland.  While the ethnic card is still played by President Chen and others, at the same time the party has been forced to modify its original party platform stance since it was brought into the political mainstream, in recognition of a strong public opposition to upsetting the status quo.   

The KMT (an abbreviation for the Nationalist Party), the party which ruled from 1947 until 2000, is, as the CNA article describes, stereotypically associated with strong ties to mainland China – which at various points in their party’s history might have meant maintenance of the status quo, or even eventual reunification with the mainland.  Yet they too have modified their image, especially during this presidential election’s campaigning, as they’ve recognized the necessity to publicly address the identity issue.  Thus, at one point during the KMT-PFP campaign, Lien and Soong prostrated to Taiwan and kissed its ground, in a symbolic gesture to brandish their allegiance to the island.  During the post-election recount controversy, former and current KMT politicians have even suggested changing the party’s name, omitting “Chinese” from the name altogether.


Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (Taipei, Taiwan); chart reproduced by Mainland Affairs Council, site accessed April 2004.

The identity issue and the associated China issue has overwhelmed the political landscape, pushing both parties closer and yet further apart, as both sides attempt to balance the need for cross-Strait stability with shifting social identifications.  In this last election, domestic development issues were largely cast aside as the identification/mainland connections topics consistently stole the spotlight.  Meanwhile, economic ties with the mainland grow stronger, with China recently becoming Taiwan’s largest trade partner, as both Beijing and Washington keep a close watch.

 



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